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While  methodologies  and  survey  techniques  recorded  progress  over  the  years,  corruption 
measurement remains a many-headed monster. Since 2003 and the first publication of Transparency 
International’s Global Corruption Barometer, researchers have access to population’s feeling about the 
corruption scourge across institutions. Thereby, wider room emerged for populations’ perceptions in 
the field of corruption quantification.  
In this paper,  we  analyze the  gulf separating perceived corruption from experienced bribe 
situations using global household surveys in a Panel dataset.   
We show that the gap between these two types of data can be wide and unevenly distributed across 






  Bien que les techniques d’enqu￪te et les méthodologies se soient améliorées au fil des 
années,  la  mesure  corruption  demeure  problématique.  Depuis  2003  et  la  première  publication  du 
Baromètre Mondial de la Corruption par Transparency International, les chercheurs ont dorénavant 
accès aux perceptions des populations pour évaluer l’￩tendue de la corruption au sein de diff￩rentes 
administrations.  
  Dans  cet  article,  nous  analysons  l’￩cart  entre  les  perceptions  de  la  corruption  et 
l’exp￩rience concr￨te de celle-ci en utilisant des donn￩es de panel issues d’enqu￪tes m￩nages men￩es 
à  une  échelle  mondiale.  Nous  comparons  ainsi,  au  sein  même  des  populations,  les  écarts  entre 
exp￩riences et perceptions de la corruption, afin d’isoler au mieux les m￩canismes ￠ l’œuvre dans la 
construction des perceptions. Nous montrons alors que les écarts  entre ces deux types  de donnée 
peuvent être importants et inégalement distribués. 
 
 
Keywords: Corruption, Global Corruption Barometer, Governance, CPI, Transparency International, 
Corruption measurement, Perception indicators, Press freedom, Econometrics, Panel Data, Household surveys.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
 
Psychologists and cognitive scientists have long studied perception mechanisms and surveys 
design, from happiness  studies [Cantril, H., (1965); Easterlin, R.A., (1974)] to corruption surveys 
[Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S., (2001); Douhou, S., Magnus, J.R., Van Soest, A., (2011), Jensen, 
N.M., Rahman, A., (2011)]. 
 
A  flourishing  literature  now  studies  corruption  determinants  from  the  existing  various 
barometers while performing comparisons with experts' assessments, usually at a national or regional 
level [Attila, G. (2008); Moyal, P., Rossi, M., Rossi, T. (2004); Razafrindrakoto, M., Roubaud, F. 
(2006)]. A few articles have informed such comparisons at a global-scale [Roca, T. 2010a]. 
 
Yet, case studies have informed the different results provided by victimization surveys (or 
bribery reporting) and experts’ indicators [Č￡belkov￡, I. (2001); Donchev, D., Ujhelyi, G. (2009); 
Olken, B., (2006); Razafrindrakoto, M., Roubaud, F. (2006); Rose, R., Mishler, W. (2010).  
Nevertheless, only few papers operate cross-sectional studies to identify measurement hazards using 
populations’ perceptions and bribery reporting [Mocan, N. (2004), Weber Abramo, C. (2008)].  
 
The existing literature shows that experts’ perceptions and victimization surveys barely agree 
regarding the extent of corruption, while some authors even prompted critiques of comparing these 
kinds of data, with some contending that there is no reason for them to be strongly correlated, as only 
a minority of people actually interacts with public services  [Eric Uslaner, cited in Weber Abramo 
(2008) p.41]. 
Perception indicators have also been extensively criticized [see Arnt, C., Oman, C. (2006), etc.] but 
remain the only way to “measure the unmeasurable”
1.   
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As summarized by Weber Abramo, C. (2008): “Corruption is hard to study empirically. Its many 
likely determinants interrelate in complicated ways […] As with other types of criminal activity, it is 
hard to observe directly, and so researchers must rely on surveys of corruption’s victims, the accuracy 
of which is often difficult to assess."   
 
“The disparities between opinions and experience follow no common pattern from 
country to country. If a reasonably common pattern were found, then one could uniformly 
“factor  out”  distortions  in  the  opinion-forming  processes  of  people  in  order  to  compare 
countries. The absence of such commonality reinforces the conclusion, already stemming 
from  the  analysis  of  the  aggregated  data,  that  the  “distance”  between  opinions  and 
experiences  vary  haphazardly  from  country  to  country  and  therefore,  perceptions-based 
comparisons between countries cannot be linked to differences in the underlying material 
conditions.” (Weber Abramo, C. (2008), p.5) 
 
In the line with Weber Abramo’s article, the purpose of this paper is precisely to assess the 
accuracy of populations’ perceptions, comparing  citizens’ feeling and their experiences with bribe 
situations.  However,  we  now  propose  a  systematic  analysis  of  the  spread  between  perceived  and 
experienced  corruption  at  a  global-scale,  using  surveys  from  2006  to  2010  in  a  panel  dataset. 
Moreover, contrarily to Claudio Weber Abramo, we suggest that we can identify stylized facts and a 
common pattern informing distortions in perception mechanisms. 
 
The first section of this paper describes the data and methodology we use. The second section presents 
descriptive statistics of the variable at stake while the last part focuses on the multivariate analysis of 
the gulf separating populations’ perceptions and actual experiences with corruption. 
 
 
II.  Data and methodology 
 
To perform this analysis, we gathered data from different sources, crossing objective data and 
perception indicators. Thus, we utilized data from the World Bank (GNI per capita, Population size, 
Unemployment rate), UNDP (Human Development Index), the International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems
2 (Election-years);  and perception measures from Freedom House (Freedom  of the press), 
Transparency  International  /  Gallup  (Global  Corruption  Barometers)  and  The  Gallup  World  Poll 
(Confidence data and bribery reporting). 
 
The Global Corruption Barometers (Transparency International) provide, since 2003, aggregated 
data  at  the  national  level  regarding  populations’  perceptions  of  corruption  across  national 
administrations
3 (Police, Judiciary system, Public Officials & civil servants, military, Parliament & 
legislature, Political Parties, Private sector). Using the Global Corruption Barometers (GCB) from 
2006  to  2010,  we  created  a  Populations’  Perceptions  of  Corruption  Index  (PPCI)  gathering 
populations’  perceptions  towards  the  institutions  people  faces  the  more.  However,  as  the  GCBs 
coverage is limited, we also introduced data from the Gallup World Poll: Populations’ perceptions of 
corruption in Business and Government
4. 
Aiming to compare perceptions to actual experiences with corruption, we collected data from the 
Gallup World Poll (2006 to 2010) regarding populations’ reporting of bribery
5. 
Subsequently, we created a gap index (GPV), measuring for each country (i) and year (j) (2006 to 
2010) the gulf separating perceptions from victimization data (bribery reporting). Using a multivariate 
analysis, we finally attempted to inform the determinants of this gap.  
 
 
                                                             
2 http://digest.electionguide.org/  
3 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb  
4 Respectively the percentage of the population stating that Business sector and Government is corrupted.  
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III.  Descriptive statistics and data analysis 
 
A.  Populations’ perceptions of corruption across institutions 
 
As a first description of the Global Corruption Barometer data, we performed a factor analysis 
(Principal Component Analysis on the pooled dataset) to represent the correlations among the different 





























Extracting two components, one can observe that populations’ perceptions of corruption in 
Business and corruption in the Police are the most divergent. This representation seems to provide a 
robust picture in line with intuition. Thereby, perceptions of corruption in the police, the judiciary 
system  and  civil  servants  appear  very  close,  so  as  perceptions  of  corruption  in  government  and 
political parties. Populations’ evaluation of corruption in the military seems not surprisingly the less 
correlated with the other dimensions. 
 
If this first analysis seems to provide a coherent picture, it does not however, give any clue about the 
consistency of these perceptions to describe the reality of corruption. As reminded by the existing 
literature, perceptions often embody a strong internal coherence.  
In  order  to  inform  a  first  comparison  between  victimization  surveys  and  populations’ 
perceptions, we constructed a correlation matrix confronting Bribery reporting (Gallup World Poll) 





Figure 1. Populations’ perceptions of corruption accros institutions: Principal Component Analysis 
 
Data source:  
Global Corruption Barometer 
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Table 1 shows that populations’ perceptions are not much correlated with bribe situations. 
Perceptions of corruption in Government and the Police are the most associated with victimization 
surveys.  However,  one  can  argue  that  people  are  not  likely  victim  of  bribery  from  government 
members, thus, we should consider that corruption in government is a proxy for corruption in the other 
administrations.  It seems likely that  the behavior of government officials reflects the one of civil 
servants; exemplary government would likely not tolerate a corrupted administration. 
 
As suggested by the previous factor analysis, corruption in Business and Private sector is only 
correlated with corruption in Public officials and Civil Servants (though not strongly).  
 
To investigate the gap between experiences and perceptions, we first aggregated perceptions 
data computing a Populations’ Perceptions of Corruption Index (PPCI). 
 
As the Global Corruption Barometer is not available for each country - it covered 88 countries in 2010 
to 63 in 2006 - we calculated the PPCI using also the Gallup World Poll data. Ideally, the PPCI would 
gather the following 5 dimensions for each year and country: Corruption in Public Officials and Civil 
servants (GCB); Corruption in the Local Police (GCB); Corruption in the judiciary system (GCB); 
Corruption in business (Gallup WP) and Corruption in Government (Gallup WP).  
Nevertheless, to maximize our sample size, we considered reasonable to calculate our index if at least 
two dimensions were available: 
 
PPCIi,j =   1/n x Populations’ Perception of Corruption in dimension di,j  
n= number of dimension according to data availability (with 2<n<5) 
Country: i 




Table 1. Correlations Matrix (data: 2009) 
  Populations’ perception of corruption in... 








Pearson Correlation  .427**  .413**  -.074  .264*  .390** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .000  .536  .024  .001 
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Sig. (2-tailed) 
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Pearson Correlation 
   
-.076  .736**  .753** 
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.224*  .080 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
     
.037  .461 
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87  87 
Public officials & 
Civil servants 
Pearson Correlation 
       
.794** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
       
.000 
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of population) 






Latin America and the Carribean 




B.  Comparison across continents and case studies 
 
In order to give a first taste of the distribution of the PPCI among continents, but also to inform 


























Figure 2 shows that the gap between experience and perceptions of corruption is not evenly 
distributed. For instance, if Arab States citizens report bribe situations the more, they also perceive 
corruption the less (tie with Europe and North America). On the other hand, Latin America reports a 
low  level  of  bribery  within  victimization  surveys  while  perceives  one  of  the  widest  scopes  of 
corruption.  We  displayed  in  Table  2.  The  descriptive  statistics  we  computed  supporting  this 
representation. 
 


















Sample size for 
"Accepting 
bribe…" 
Africa  74.0  19.8  41.6  51.7  65.0  (N=11) 
Latin America and the Caribbean  73.1  9.9  61.9  42.5  75.4  (N=12) 
Europe and North America  57.1  7.2  81.5  48.0  77.3  (N=25) 
CIS  68.0  20.2  49.3  37.7  66.1  (N=24) 
Asia Pacific  63.4  9.1  55.1  64.5  73.0  N=14) 
Arab countries  57.1  22.0  28.1  60.3  90.4  (N=9) 
*Mean perceptions of corruption in: Government; Police; Business; Private sector; Public officials; Civil servants; Judiciary 
Figure 2. Comparison among continents  
Data  source:  Gallup  World  Poll, 
Transparency International GCB,  
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Aiming to evaluate the weight of tolerance towards corruption, we introduced data from the 
World Value Surveys (WVS), describing the share of the population stating that “accepting bribe is 
never  justifiable”;  however,  the  coverage  of  the  WVS  appears  too  limited  to  provide  rigorous 
interpretations.   
 
The  literature  describing  perception  mechanisms  shows  that  populations  tend  to  report  more 
systematically the situations interpreted as unfair [Douhou, S., Magnus, J.R., Van Soest, A., (2011)]. 
Thereby, we would expect higher bribery reporting in countries where populations find bribery the 
less justifiable. One may argue that in countries very sensitive towards corruption, people would be 
reluctant to give a reliable answer to the bribery question. Nevertheless, the data we use deals with 
people facing bribe situation, not with respondents’ actual acceptation to give /or asking for bribe. 
 
Observing tolerance vis-à-vis bribe situations, we are not able to determine any significant 
trends. Nevertheless, this first description seems to uncover some evidence in regards to the role of 
confidence.  A  low  confidence  in  government  seems  to  be  associated  with  wider  gaps  between 
experience and perceptions. The influence of press freedom seems more controversial.  
  
To inform these assumptions we constructed a Gap Index this way: GPVi,j = PPCIi,j  - Bribery report i,j 




















Crossing our Gap index and Human Development no convincing pattern emerges. However, one can 
observe that among developed countries the standards deviation of the gap appears wider. One can 
also notice that this Gap is always positive, which is consistent with intuition: the share of the people 
perceiving corruption is always larger than the share of the people having actually experienced it. 
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To isolate better the role of press freedom and confidence, we flagged outliers - countries with the 





























Confidence in Government (2006-2009) 
2006  Panama  36 
2007  Panama  25 
2008  Panama  31 
2009  Panama  60 
Source Gallup World Poll 
* The latest data available for “Confidence in Government” in Panama 
was from 2009. In May 2009 Election took place in Panama. Thus, the 
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NB.  For  the  case  of  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  contrarily  to  Japan,  the  Global  Corruption  Barometer  was  not 
available.  The  populations’  perceptions  of  corruption  data  are  solely  the  result  of  Gallup  World  Poll  data 
regarding  corruption  in  Business  and  Government,  which  could  be  considered  as  an  imperfect  proxy  for 
corruption in other institutions. However, table 1 showed that corruption in government and corruption in other 
administrations were strongly correlated. 
 
Countries like Trinidad and Tobago or Japan display a tremendous gap between bribery reporting and 
corruption  perceptions.  Countries  displaying  the  smallest  gaps  are  the  ones  reporting  the  highest 
confidence in government. The question of endogeneity thereby arouses. However, we observe that 
people’s  faith  in  institutions
6  is  not  much  affected  by  the  extent  of  bribery,  while  perceptions  of 
corruption are strongly correlated with populations’ confidence in institutions (see Table 4). 
Opposing two patterns, the “outliars” – countries where the population perceives much corruption 
while reporting very few cases of bribery – and the outliers – countries with the smallest gap between 
bribery and perceived corruption – leads to these first observations: 
                                                             
6 We computed a Confidence Index gathering confidence in local police, government, judicial syst. and military. 
*However, confidence in the 
local police scores: 88% (2009) 
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- Low confidence in 
Government 
- Freedom of the press 
- Low bribery reporting 
 
- Confidence in 
Government 
- Freedom of the press 
- Low corruption 
 
- Confidence in Government 
- Low freedom of the press 
- Low corruption 
 
  The “outliars” have both  free press and low confidence in their government; 
   The outliers display strong confidence in their government, but free press seems not decisive. 
 
We suggest that countries with free press, thin spread between experienced and perceived corruption 
are likely the countries where “real” corruption prevalence is the lower. Nevertheless, as informed 
previously, the existence of controlled media cast doubt upon corruption measurement.  
 
C.  The influence of Press freedom 
 





















Investigating the correlations between our Gap index (GPV) and press freedom, a quadratic 
adjustment curve arouses, resulting from the one already uncovered between populations’ perceptions 
of corruption and media freedom [See Brown, J., Orme, W. and Roca, T., (2010)]. 
As  corruption  experience  and  freedom  of  the  press  follow  a  linear  association,  the  resulting  gap 
displays  this  concave  adjustment.  The  comparison  between  linear  and  quadratic  adjustment  is 










Figure 4. Functional form investigation Gap and press freedom: towards stylized facts  
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We  observe  that  populations’  perceptions  and  bribery  reporting  tend  to  converge  in 
autocracies and in countries where corruption is likely not widespread. For other countries, freedom of 
the press seems to enlarge the gap between perceptions and corruption exposure. 
 
It seems likely that in countries suffering from a challenged freedom of the press, perceptions 
are  mainly  the  consequence  of  experience,  whereas  in  accountable  democracies,  corruption 
perceptions are mostly the fact of media reporting.  
 
 
D.  The role of confidence  
 
We have hitherto made the assumption that people’s confidence in institutions may explain part of 
the  gap  between  reported  experiences  of  corruption  and  perceptions.  Indeed,  we  assume  that 
perceptions are more correlated with confidence than experiences actually are. To investigate further 
this  hypothesis,  we  gathered  data  from  the  Gallup  World  Poll  describing  confidence  in  different 
institutions. Table 3 shows that confidence among institutions is quite well articulated: 
 
In order to use confidence as an explanatory variable in a multivariate analysis, we decided to create a 
Confidence Index aggregating the previous data using a Principal Components Analysis (PCA).  
The  strong  correlations  flagged  beforehand  likely  induce  significant  KMO
7  and  Bartlett  test.  Our 
results  confirm  a  KMO  =  0.822  and  a  Bartlett  Sphericity  test  =  834.777,  rejecting  non-global 




Table 4. Aggregation using PCA 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
   Component 
1 
Confidence in Government  0.275 
Confidence in Local Police  0.298 
Confidence in Judicial syst.  0.301 
Confidence in Military  0.298 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
                                                             
7 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) is the ratio of the sum of correlations square and partial correlations square. A 
value higher than 0.6 indicates a suitable PCA. 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix, Confidence in institutions  












Sig. (2-tailed)    .000  .000  .000 
N  482  459  462  430 
Confidence government  Pearson Correlation    1  .643
**  .560
** 
Sig. (2-tailed)      .000  .000 
N    464  452  423 
Confidence judicial syst  Pearson Correlation      1  .679
** 
Sig. (2-tailed)        .000 
N      513  428 
Confidence military  Pearson Correlation        1 
Sig. (2-tailed)         
N        448 
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The endogeneity issue 
The  role  of  confidence  in  corruption  assessment  appears  controversial.  Indeed,  while  corruption 
experiences may ruin one’s faith in administration, it also seems likely that people with originally no 
confidence  in  institutions  would  declare  them  corrupted  answering  perception  surveys.  Thus,  an 
endogeneity issue arises.  
Our  purpose  is  to  investigate  the  gap  between  perceptions  and  bribery  reporting.  Introducing 
confidence, we assume that faith would impact more sorely one of the two components of the GPV, 
for instance, the perception dimension. Comparing confidence influence towards both experienced and 
perceived corruption would provide a first clue for resolving the endogeneity dilemma.  
Table 4 displays the correlations among our Confidence Index, Transparency’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), Bribery reporting and Populations’ perceptions of corruption. 
   
 
  We observe that whether all three corruption measures are correlated, in an intuitive way with 
confidence, experienced corruption appears the less associated with confidence (-0.2339).  
Confidence seems, however, strongly correlated (adversely) with populations’ perceptions, while not 
much  with  experts’  perceptions.  Furthermore,  bribery  reporting  is  not  strongly  linked  with 
populations’ perceptions (0.3577), whereas correlation becomes much stronger if we consider experts’ 
evaluations  (0.5158  in  absolute  value).  From  these  observations,  we  can  draw  the  following 
conclusions: 
 
  Populations’ perceptions incorporate people’s faith in administrations; 
  Confidence in administration is not much affected by corruption experience; 
  Experts’ perceptions are more associated with corruption experience, and less influenced by 
people’s confidence in institutions. 
 
This  picture  tends  to  demonstrate  that  the  gulf  separating  perceptions  from  experience  is  likely 
influenced  by  populations’  confidence  in  administrations  and  that  experts’  assessments  almost 
certainly provide the most robust corruption evaluation.  
 
 
Table 4. Correlations matrix: Perceptions,  Bribery reporting and Confidence 












Pearson Correlation  1  0.3577*  -0.6441*  -0.5148* 
Sig. (2-tailed)    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
N  553  252  540  553 
Bribery report 
Pearson Correlation    1  -0.5158*  -0.2339* 
Sig. (2-tailed)      0.0000  0.0001 
N     269  265  269 
CPI (Transparency 
International) 
Pearson Correlation      1  0.2534* 
Sig. (2-tailed)        0.0000 
N        876  876 
Confidence Index 
Pearson Correlation        1 
Sig. (2-tailed)         
N           985 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
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E.   Perception of corruption, from bribe to gossip? 
 
As  last  descriptive  analysis,  we  decided  to  visualize  the  relationship  between  experience  and 
populations’ perceptions. The following curve adjustment describes what revealed to be a curvilinear 
relation. Indeed, the logarithm fit displays a R²= 0.221 versus 0.128 for the linear adjustment (see 
Appendix Table b.) The Y=X equation stands for a perfect correlation between these two variables, 



















This  representation  shows  that  perceptions  increase  following  a  non-linear  course  together  with 
corruption experiences. Thereby, perceptions increase at a break-neck pace when populations start 
experiencing corruption and ultimately rise more cautiously when corruption becomes widespread. 
 
We  suggest  that  voice  (Word  of mouth),  associated  with  free  media,  magnifies  corruption  gossip 
increasing  perceptions  non-linearly.  Flagging  outliers,  we  previously  underlined  that  4%  of  a 
population  having  experienced  corruption  can  induce  92%  of  this  population  to  perceive 
administrations as corrupted (case of Trinidad and Tobago). 
 
So far, we have showed that press freedom and confidence may explain part of the gulf separating 
populations’ perceptions from actual experience with corruption. In the next and last section, we will 
perform a multivariate analysis using panel data to inform these assumptions and try to identify further 
explanatory variables. 
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IV.  Multivariate analysis 
 
As previously mentioned, we gathered data from various sources in a panel dataset (2006 to 2010, 
see section II). We use data aggregated at the national level which, unfortunately, prevent us from 
using respondent’s characteristics as control variables. However, we introduced nationally aggregated 
controls such as subjective well-being data (Life satisfaction), unemployment rate or election-years. 
We  assume  these  variables  may  grasp  populations’  satisfaction,  influencing  their  perceptions  of 
institutions but not the amount of actual corruption people faces, thereby increasing the gap between 
perceived and experienced corruption (GPV).  
 
In order to evaluate rigorously the influence of press freedom and confidence in explaining the 
GPV,  we  constructed  a  first  basic  model,  we  tested  to  detect  the  existence  of  random  effects, 
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation: 
 
A.  Methodological issue  
 
1. Comparing fix (1.) and random (2.) effect models 
 
1.  GPVij = αij + β1Press freedomij + β2 Press freedom²ij + β3 Confidence Indexij + Ԑij    
with  i = 1,..,N ; j = 1,…, N 
 
2.  GPVij = αij + β1Press freedomij + β2 Press freedom²ij + β3 Confidence Indexij +  ui + Ԑij    
with  i = 1,..,N ; j = 1,…, N 
 
 
To isolate the existence of random effect we used the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test. 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier statistic is given by: 
 






2 the estimated correlation between the residuals of the M equations; and T, the number of 
observations; L is distributed following a χ², M(M-1)/2 degrees of freedom. 
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
GPV [code,t] = Xb + u[code] + e[code,t] ;  
Estimated results: 
Test: Var (u) = 0 
Chi² (1) = 72.00 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
The null hypothesis stands for Var(u)= 0, thus, a significant 
result rejects Var(u)= 0.  
 
Table 5. Fix effects estimation of the GPV 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  t  P>|t| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Press freedom  1.463  1.163  1.26  0.211  -0.840  3.767 
Press freddom²  -0.018  0.013  -1.36  0.176  -0.043  0.008 
Confidence Index  -3.966**  1.596  -2.48  0.014  -7.128  -0.803 
Constant  32.029  24.844  1.29  0.200  -17.186  81.244 
F(3,114) =2.32 
Prob > F = 0.079 
N= 250 
Dependent variable: Gap between Populations’ Perception of Corruption and victimization surveys (GPV) 
  Var  sd=sqrt(Var)   
GPV  264.1980  16.2542 
e  44.9728  6.7062 





































1MEASURING CORRUPTION: PERCEPTION SURVEYS OR VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS?  15 
 As the result appears significant we must reject the fix effect model for the random effect one. Table 
6, displays the estimation of the basic model using the random effect model:  
 
2.  Heteroskedasticity diagnostic 
As corruption data backed on household surveys still suffers from incomplete coverage, the number of 
missing  values  in  our  dataset  may  lead  to  an  unbalanced  panel  that  frequently  introduces 
heteroskedasticity.  In  order  to  diagnose  it,  we  performed  a  Likelihood-ratio  (LR)  test  for 
heteroskedasticity: 
 
Likelihood-ratio test:  LR chi² (132) = 331.10 
                                        Prob > chi²    = 0.0000 
 
The null hypothesis standing for homoskedasticity, the Likelihood-ratio test indicates that our panel 
faces heteroskedasticity. The most accurate estimation is then provided by a Generalized Least Square 
(GLS) estimator. 
 
3.  First-order autocorrelation test 
We ultimately performed a first-order autocorrelation test, using the Wooldridge test [see Drukker, 
D.M. (2003)]. The null hypothesis stands for no first-order autocorrelation.  
We display above the F-Test: 
 
         F (1, 29) =   0.269 
Prob > F =   0.608 
 
The null hypothesis is not rejected; thus, no further corrections appear necessary.  
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
The tests we performed show that the Generalized Least Square model would provide consistent 
estimators. Table 7, displays the GLS estimations of the GPV determinants: 
 
Table 6. Random effects estimation of the GPV 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Press freedom  1.695***  0.257  6.60  0.000  1.191  2.198 
Press freddom²  -0.016***  0.002  -6.49  0.000  -0.020  -0.011 
Confidence Index  -4.843***  0.943  -5.13  0.000  -6.692  -2.994 
Constant  14.374**  6.136  2.34  0.019  2.348  26.401 
Wald chi2(3) = 82.54 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
N= 250 
Dependent variable: GPV: Gap between Populations’ Perception of Corruption and victimization surveys 
Table 7. Generalized Least Square estimation of the GPV determinants : basic model 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Press freedom  1.746***  0.045  38.63  0.000  1.657  1.835 
Press freedom²  -0.016***  0.000  -44.90  0.000  -0.017  -0.015 
Confidence Index  -4.175***  0.171  -24.36  0.000  -4.511  -3.839 
Constant  13.345***  1.325  10.07  0.000  10.749  15.941 
Wald chi2(3) = 10924.16 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
N=250 
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Interpretation 
These results confirm that our predictors provide a strong overall explanatory power - Wald chi2(3) = 
10924.16 - supported by 250 observations. The previously uncovered quadratic adjustment between 
press freedom and the GPV is now established, so as the adverse correlation with confidence: the less 
people trust administrations, the deeper the gap between perceptions and experienced corruption. 
 
 
B.  Introducing new controls 
 
While the previous explanatory variables confirm their role, we decided to test other controls.  We 
introduced objective variables expecting the following behaviors:  
 
1.  Logarithm  of  Growth  National  Income  (GNI):  we  assume  that  overall,  countries  with  higher 
incomes benefit from more efficient institutions. Moreover, we suppose that wealthier countries 
can afford providing descent salaries to their civil servants reducing corruption incentives. 
We  may  this  way  observe  both  less  perceived  and  experienced  corruption  decreasing  the  gap. 
However, the resulting effect seems hard to evaluate and non-mechanical. Outliers profile already 
illustrated very different configurations from Japan and Italy to Finland or Qatar. 
 
2.  The size of the population:  the existing literature stresses that the size of the population matters. 
As informed with table 4, perceptions and experienced corruption do not evolve together linearly. 
We suggested that media and word-of-mouth significantly influence perceptions which could be in 
the first place, the result of corruption exposures. A single corruption deed, flagged in the media 
may influence a whole country, whatever the size of its population, explaining that perceptions are 
not linearly dependant of experiences using data expressed in percentage of the population. Bigger 
countries may thus display wider gap. 
 
3.  A binary variable reporting if presidential or legislative elections were organized the year of the 
survey.  Political  scientists  usually  report  high  confidence  in  governments  the  year  following 
elections. Yet, we informed the case of Panama showing a confidence leap from 31 to 60 % the 
year of election. However, we suppose that confidence grasp much of the effect of an election-year 
variable.  Furthermore,  we  were  not  able  to  discriminate  efficiently  by  months;  however,  we 
suppressed from our dataset elections that took place at the very end of the year, assuming that 
Gallup surveys respondents had already been polled. 
We coded the election-year variable this way: 1, elections were organized the year of the survey, 0 
if not.   
 
4.  Unemployment  rate:  we  assume  that  a  high  employment  rate  prevents  populations  from 
expressing too much negative opinion about governments and institutions. Reversely, we suppose 
that  populations’  judgment  regarding  their  country  leadership  may  reveal  much  harsher  in  an 
employment crisis context. Furthermore, literature tends to show that people perceptions tend to be 
affected by their fairness feelings (see Douhou, S., Magnus, J.R., Van Soest, A., (2011)). 
 
5.  Finally and following the same reasoning, we introduced a subjective measure of well being (Life 
satisfaction).  Once  again,  we  suppose  that  citizens  are  more  “indulgent”  with  government  and 
administrations when they are satisfied with their lives. Thus, we expect the Gap to decrease with 
life satisfaction enhancement.  
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  Our  results  appear  quite  consistent,  fulfilling  our  expectations.  GNI,  Confidence  and  Life 
satisfaction reduce the gap between experienced corruption and perceptions, while unemployment and 
the size of the population widen it. The results regarding election-year appear not in line with our 
intuition and the sign of the coefficients appears sensible to the sample size. However, we suggest that 
the data collection period is decisive for this variable. More precise data would be necessary to inform 
the role of election and electoral campaigns, usually involving finger-pointing and stubborn debates, 
likely generating negative perceptions towards institutions the year before elections. 
 
  Overall,  the  multivariate  analysis  confirms  the  pattern  we  described,  showing  that  media 
freedom and confidence should be taken into account to analyze rigorously populations’ evaluations of 
administrations.  We  also  suggest,  as  far  as  data  are  available,  to  compare  perceptions  with 








Table 8. GLS estimation of the Gap between populations’ perceptions of corruption and bribe situations  
Tested model  
/Parameters        
Basic model  Model (a.)  Model (b.)  Model (c.)  Model (d.)  Model (e.) 
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Unemployment rate  
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Wald   10924.16  2837.79  7215.07  7077.92  2676.25  829.67 
Prob > chi2   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sample size N=  250  249  249  249  248  122 
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V.  Concluding remarks 
 
  Using  household  surveys,  we  investigated  the  gap  between  perceived  and  experienced 
corruption. We gathered data from the Gallup World Poll and Transparency International’s Global 
Corruption Barometer, reporting actual corruption experiences, but also population’s perceptions of 
corruption in several institutions (Police, Government, Public officials and Civil servants, Judiciary 
system and Business). 
 
  Our first descriptive analysis showed that the gulf separating these two kinds of data can be 
thorough and unevenly distributed among countries. We underlined the role of confidence and press 
freedom in perception mechanisms.  
Introducing  further  controls,  we  showed  that  populations  might  be  more  indulgent  towards 
administrations if people were satisfied with their lives, employed or living in wealthy countries. 
We also suggested that confidence may introduce an endogeneity issue as distrust in institutions could 
result from experienced corruption or induce harsh reporting in perception surveys. Nevertheless, we 
highlighted that the confidence index we computed was much more correlated with perceptions than 
with  actual  bribe  situations.  Further  research  remains  however  necessary  to  confirm  these  first 
findings, although instrumental variables seem difficult to identify.     
 
  We ultimately  uncovered a curvilinear  relationship linking  experiences to perceptions. We 
suggested that word-of-mouth and “gossips” might magnify actual bribery experiences, driving a non-
linear perception swell. 
 
  Considering the results of the previous analyses, we would recommend data users to compare 
systematically corruption perceptions to victimization surveys – if consistent across countries. We 
suggest that the wider the gap between these two types of sources, the less reliable perception data. We 
display  in  appendix  -  Table  m  -  the  top  and  bottom  30  countries  in  regard  to  our  Gap  index. 
Nevertheless, we suggest controlling the GPV using press freedom evaluation since we previously 
informed a media bias affecting corruption perceptions in autocracies. 
  
This paper ultimately highlights the need for actionable reliability indices. We will soon propose one 
in an upcoming research paper.  
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  Table a. Functional form investigation: freedom of press and Gap perception - victimization 
Quadratic adjustment  Coefficients 
Variables 
Freedom of Press   1.915*** 
t  (9.279) 
Freedom of Press
2  -0.017*** 
t  (-8.956) 
R²  0.260 
adjusted  R²    0.254 
Sample size (N)  250 
Linear adjustment 
Variable 
Freedom of Press   0.104** 
t  (2.196) 
R²  0.019 
adjusted R²    0.015 
Sample size (N)  250 
Dependant variable: Gap between Perception and Victimization (GPV) 
Y= 0.104x + 47.82 
Y= 1.92x – 0.02x² + 8.92 
Figure a. Functional form investigation: GPV and Press freedom (Pooled dataset) 
 
 






































































  Table b. Functional form investigation: corruption experience versus corruption perception   
Linear adjustment  Coefficients 
Variables 
Population declaring victim of bribery  0.632*** 
t  (6.056) 
R²  0.128 
adjusted  R²    0.124 
Sample size (N)  252 
Logarithmic adjustment 
Variable 
Log Population declaring victim of bribery  11.240*** 
t  (8.410) 
R²  0.221 
adjusted R²    0.217 
Sample size (N)  252 
Dependant variable: Population Perception of Corruption 
Table c. Aggregation confidence data: PCA significance test 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin  Measure of Sampling Adequacy  0.822 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square  834.777 
df  6 
Sig.  .000 
Table d. Aggregation confidence data:  PCA summary 
Total Variance Explained 
Component  Initial Eigenvalues  Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total  % of Variance  Cumulative %  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
  
1  2.908  72.710  72.710  2.908  72.710  72.710 
2  .482  12.060  84.770       
3  .321  8.027  92.797       
4  .288  7.203  100.000       













































Table f. Generalized Least Square estimation of GPV determinants: Introducing new controls 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Press freedom  1.587***  0.061  25.89  0.000  1.467  1.707 
Press freedom²  -0.013***  0.001  -23.79  0.000  -0.015  -0.012 
Confidence Index  -3.938***  0.253  -15.56  0.000  -4.434  -3.442 
Log GNI  -7.803***  0.329  -23.74  0.000  -8.447  -7.159 
Constant  43.820***  2.044  21.44  0.000  39.814  47.826 
Wald chi2(4) = 5887.85 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
N=249 
Dependent variable:  Gap between Populations’ Perception of Corruption and victimization surveys (GPV) 
Table g. Generalized Least Square estimation of GPV determinants:  Introducing new controls 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Press freedom  1.456***  0.075  19.49  0.000  1.309  1.602 
Press freedom²  -0.012***  0.001  -16.55  0.000  -0.014  -0.011 
Confidence Index  -4.414***  0.246  -17.94  0.000  -4.896  -3.932 
Log GNI  -7.790***  0.548  -14.22  0.000  -8.864  -6.716 
Log Population  2.009***  0.175  11.45  0.000  1.665  2.353 
Constant  12.937***  3.853  3.36  0.001  5.385  20.489 
Wald chi2(5) = 2837.79 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
N=249 
Dependent variable:  Gap between Populations’ Perception of Corruption and victimization surveys (GPV) 
Table h. Generalized Least Square estimation of GPV determinants:  Introducing new controls 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Press freedom  1.384***  0.070  19.920  0.000  1.248  1.521 
Press freedom²  -0.011***  0.001  -17.26  0.000  -0.013  -0.010 
Confidence Index  -4.526***  0.232  -19.49  0.000  -4.981  -4.071 
Log GNI  -8.010***  0.300  -26.69  0.000  -8.598  -7.422 
Log Population  2.329***  0.229  10.19  0.000  1.881  2.777 
Election-year   2.876***  0.735  3.91  0.000  1.436  4.316 
Constant  9.652***  3.983  2.42  0.015  1.846  17.459 
Wald chi2(6) = 7077.92 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
N=249 










































Table I displays our Basic model estimation using a relative Gap index computed this way:  
RelGPVi,j = (PPCIi,j  - Bribery report i,j) / PPCIi,j  x100 
 
Table i. Generalized Least Square estimation of GPV determinants:  Introducing new controls 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Press freedom  1.353***  0.075  18.05  0.000  1.206  1.500 
Press freedom²  -0.011***  0.001  -14.77  0.000  -0.013  -0.010 
Confidence Index  -4.433***  0.295  -15.02  0.000  -5.012  -3.855 
Log GNI  -5.979***  0.929  -6.43  0.000  -7.801  -4.158 
Log Population  2.393***  0.221  10.83  0.000  1.960  2.826 
Election-year  3.681***  0.917  4.01  0.000  1.884  5.478 
Life satisfaction  -1.527***  0.472  -3.23  0.001  -2.453  -0.601 
Constant  9.468**  4.469  2.12  0.034  0.708  18.228 
Wald chi2(7) = 2676.25 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
N=248 
Dependent variable:  Gap between Populations’ Perception of Corruption and victimization surveys (GPV) 
Table j. Generalized Least Square estimation of GPV determinants:  Introducing new controls 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Press freedom  1.303***  0.140  9.29  0.000  1.028  1.578 
Press freedom²  -0.010***  0.001  -7.40  0.000  -0.012  -0.007 
Confidence Index  -6.597***  0.614  -10.74  0.000  -7.802  -5.393 
Log GNI  -11.528***  3.026  -3.81  0.000  -17.459  -5.596 
Log Population  2.605***  0.431  6.05  0.000  1.761  3.449 
Election-year  -4.334***  1.633  -2.65  0.008  -7.534  -1.134 
Life satisfaction  -1.625***  0.744  -2.18  0.029  -3.083  -0.167 
Unemployment rate  0.372***  0.088  4.22  0.000  0.199  0.545 
Constant  26.489**  12.771  2.07  0.038  1.459  51.519 
Wald chi2(8) = 829.67 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
N=122 
Dependent variable:  Gap between Populations’ Perception of Corruption and victimization surveys (GPV) 
Table l. Generalized Least Square estimation of the GPV determinants : basic model 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Press freedom  1.027***  0.020  52.06  0.000  0.989  1.066 
Press freedom²  -0.007***  0.000  -38.48  0.000  -0.007  -0.007 
Confidence Index  1.276***  0.111  11.47  0.000  1.058  1.494 
Constant  46.322***  0.550  84.20  0.000  45.243  47.400 
Wald chi2(3) =  6136.31 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
N=250 
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Table m. Rankings: Gap between perceived and experienced corruption (Both using household surveys)  
Rank  country  year  GPV
1  Relative GPV
2  Nb. Perception sources
3 
Top 30 
1  Trinidad and Tobago  2008  86.00  95.56  2 
2  Croatia  2009  82.00  91.11  2 
3  Italy  2008  80.50  95.27  2 
4  Panama  2009  79.67  93.00  3 
5  Indonesia  2008  78.00  88.64  2 
6  Panama  2008  78.00  92.86  2 
7  South Africa  2009  77.00  85.56  2 
8  Indonesia  2009  76.67  95.04  3 
9  Nepal  2009  76.50  90.53  2 
10  Chad  2008  76.00  82.61  2 
11  Argentina  2009  75.00  90.36  3 
12  Sierra Leone  2008  74.50  83.24  2 
13  South Africa  2008  74.50  90.30  2 
14  Portugal  2009  74.00  94.87  2 
15  Israel  2008  73.50  86.98  2 
16  Portugal  2008  73.50  92.45  2 
17  Cambodia  2009  73.33  86.96  3 
18  Bosnia and Herzegovina  2009  73.00  82.95  2 
19  Japan  2008  73.00  96.05  2 
20  Nepal  2008  73.00  89.02  2 
21  Paraguay  2008  72.50  85.80  2 
22  Peru  2009  72.33  85.77  3 
23  Senegal  2010  71.80  84.67  5 
24  Argentina  2008  71.50  91.08  2 
25  Burundi  2008  71.50  85.63  2 
26  Bulgaria  2009  71.00  84.52  2 
27  Honduras  2009  71.00  88.75  2 
28  Malaysia  2008  70.50  90.97  2 
29  Paraguay  2009  70.50  87.58  2 
30  Comoros  2009  69.50  86.34  2 
Bottom 30 
222  Somalia  2009  33.00  66.00  2 
223  Rwanda  2009  30.00  75.00  2 
224  Tajikistan  2009  30.00  63.83  2 
225  Uruguay  2010  30.00  83.33  2 
226  Niger  2009  29.50  63.44  2 
227  Algeria  2010  29.00  45.31  2 
228  Azerbaijan  2008  28.50  47.90  2 
229  Australia  2008  28.00  77.78  2 
230  Canada  2008  28.00  80.00  2 
231  Luxembourg  2008  28.00  87.50  2 
232  Kuwait  2009  27.50  59.14  2 
233  Tunisia  2008  27.50  45.45  2 
234  Belarus  2009  27.33  55.41  3 
235  Syrian Arab Republic  2009  26.00  52.00  2 
236  Belarus  2008  23.50  54.02  2 
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1 Absolute Gap between Populations’ Perception of Corruption (PPCI) and bribery reporting: 
GPVi,j = PPCIi,j  - Bribery report i,j 
 
2 Relative Gap between Populations’ Perception of Corruption (PPCI) and bribery reporting: 
RelGPVi,j = (PPCIi,j  - Bribery report i,j) / PPCIi,j  x100 
 
3 Number of indicators we use to calculate the PPCI (according to available data) 
 
NB. The difference between absolute and relative Gap could be important especially for countries 
flagging low level of corruption (both  experienced  and perceived).  In order to  not penalize  these 
countries,  we  decided  that  absolute  difference  was  a  more  appropriate  computation  method. 
Nevertheless, overall regression results do not vary extensively. Table l, display the estimations of the 
basic model using the gap computed with the relative formula. 
238  Denmark  2009  22.50  81.82  2 
239  Afghanistan  2010  21.60  33.44  5 
240  Hong Kong, China (SAR)  2008  19.50  86.67  2 
241  New Zealand  2008  19.50  68.42  2 
242  Somalia  2010  19.00  46.34  2 
243  Sweden  2008  18.00  75.00  2 
244  Bahrain  2009  17.00  45.95  2 
245  Denmark  2008  16.50  76.74  2 
246  Saudi Arabia  2008  15.50  36.47  2 
247  Singapore  2009  13.33  93.02  3 
248  Syrian Arab Republic  2008  9.00  17.31  2 
249  Finland  2008  8.00  47.06  2 
250  Saudi Arabia  2009  5.50  15.94  2 
251  Singapore  2008  5.00  83.33  2 
252  Qatar  2009  3.50  30.43  2 
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